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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONOPOLISTIC
LEVERAGING THEORY AND ITS APPROPRIATE
ROLE IN ANTITRUST LAW
Jennifer M. Clarke-Smith'

Monopolistic leveraging is "the use of monopoly power' in one market
to strengthen a monopoly share in another market."2 Historically, courts
and commentators have applied the theory of monopolistic leveraging in

two ways3 in the context of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Section 2). 4 In
some instances, courts have used monopolistic leveraging as a description
of the way in which actual or attempted monopolization is pursued.'
When monopolistic leveraging is used in this manner, courts typically
agree that it is a violation of Section 2.6 In other cases, courts have found
that leveraging monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive
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1.
"Monopoly power" is the ability to control prices and output or to exclude
competitors from the market. F.T.C. Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga, Remarks Before
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission: Panel Discussion on Technological Innovation,
International Trade and Competition Policy, (Dec. 1, 1997), 1997 WL 778602 (F.T.C.).
Market share is an essential factor in ascertaining whether a firm has monopoly power. Id.
Generally, a market share greater than seventy percent indicates monopoly power, while a
market share less than fifty percent is evidence against a finding of monopoly power. Id.
2.
Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways, 257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001);
see also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979); William F. Dolan, Developments in Private
Antitrust Enforcement in 2000, 1252 PLI/CoRP 891, 978 (2001); Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 859, 877
(1998) (explaining that leveraging occurs "when a firm uses its advantage from operating
in one market to gain an advantage in selling into one or more other, generally related
markets").
3.
Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel, Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging,
40 ANTITRUST BULL. 371, 373 (1995).
4.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). While the leveraging theory is relevant under both Section 1
of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, this Comment will only explore its
relation to Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 879 (stating that
leveraging may be achieved through a variety of methods, including tying, bundling,
exclusive dealing, and low pricing).
5.
Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 373-74, 395.
6.
Id. (noting that "[m]onopoly leveraging is often used to describe the way in which
a monopolist.., monopolizes or attempts to monopolize a second market" and that there
is little disagreement among courts on that issue).
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advantage in a secondary market is a violation of Section 2.' Against this
backdrop, conflicting views have surfaced as economists debate whether
leveraging of monopoly power to gain economic benefit is even possible.'
The judicial struggle to determine what degree of leveraging is
required to substantiate a Section 2 violation has divided the circuits. 9
While the split has existed for more than ten years, courts are now
declining to decide the issue.'0 The Supreme Court's view is unclear at
best. Within the course of a year, the Court appeared to adopt
conflicting perspectives. In one case, the Court seemed to confirm that
monopolistic leveraging is a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act."
In a subsequent case, the Court held that unilateral action only amounts
to a violation if it rises to the level of attempted or actual
monopolization. 2 Instead of removing the confusion among the circuits,
7.
Kerasotes Michigan Theatres v. Nat'l Amusements, 854 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.
1988); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275; Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 373-75 (concluding
that the legality of monopoly leveraging is controversial when it refers to a monopolist's
use of its market power to achieve a competitive advantage in a second market without
creating a substantial probability of successful monopolization in the second market).
8.
Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079,
2081-87 (1999) (outlining the debate among economists as to whether leveraging can be
economically beneficial); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through
Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515-17 (1985); see also Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Michael
T. Mumford, Does Predatory Pricing Exist? Economic Theory and the Courts After
Brooke Group, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 949, 981 (1996) (discussing the different standard
used in evaluating leveraging claims and acknowledging criticism that suggests that
leveraging claims are groundless).
9.
Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Texas State Soccer Ass'n, Inc., 213 F.3d 198, 206 n.16 (5th
Cir. 2000) (declining to rule on the application of the monopoly leveraging theory of
liability and noting the split among courts on the issue); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
195 F.3d 1346, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1.999) (discussing the use of the monopoly leveraging
theory and the various standards courts have used to evaluate such claims); see also
Patrick Lynch, Monopolization, Attempted Monopolization and Joint Ventures, 1251
PLI/CORP 279, 301 (2001).
10. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways, 257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that the viability of the leveraging doctrine as articulated in Berkey is questionable
and deciding the case on other grounds); Eleven Line, Inc., 213 F.3d at 206 n.16 (declining
to rule on the monopoly leveraging issue).
11. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992)
(holding that the use of monopoly power in a market to strengthen its monopoly share of
another market is a violation of Section 2 and stating that "[t]he second element of a §2
claim is the use of monopoly power to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive
advantage, or to destroy a competitor" (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,
107 (1948)). The Court found that Kodak used its parts monopoly to increase its
monopoly share of the Kodak service market. Id. at 483.
,12. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,459 (1993) (holding that Section
2 of the Sherman Act "makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually
monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so").
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the Court's inconsistent statements on the issue have left this area of law
unsettled.13
The Sherman Antitrust Act (the Act) was passed in 1890 to limit
monopoly power and protect competition.1 4 The Act is divided into two
main sections. Section 1 prohibits concerted activity of two or more
entities that combine, contract, or conspire in restraint of trade. 5 Section
2 addresses unilateral actions and prohibits monopolization or attempted
monopolization in restraint of trade. 6 As a result of the different
approaches of Sections 1 and 2, a "gap" exists in the law. 7 Concerted
activity violates the Act by unreasonably restraining trade, while single
firm activity is a violation only if it actually monopolizes or attempts to
monopolize a given market. 8 Thus, some unilateral acts that are allowed
under the Act would be considered violations if performed through a
combination of two or more firms.' 9
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. See Berkey Photo, 603 F,2d at 275 (stating that the purpose of the Sherman Act is
to ensure an efficient market and prevent firms with monopoly power from disrupting that
market); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (acknowledging
"Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses"); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) (stating that
"[tihe Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade"); see also Twin
Laboratories, Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting
that Berkey Photo required "tangible harm to competition").
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
Section 1 violations have included practices such as price fixing, allocation of territory or
customers among finns, and tying arrangements. See generally William C. Holmes, 1987
ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 35-138 (1987) (analyzing Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
For an example of an early Section 1 case, see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine, or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.; see also
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69, 774-77 (1984)
(indicating that Section 2 requires less scrutiny of single firm actions than that required by
Section 1 of conduct by multiple firms working together and that Congress made a
purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted conduct).
17. Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 775.
18. Id. at 767-68, 774-75.
19. Id. at 774. The Supreme Court recognized the gap in liability for anticompetitive
conduct, stating:
It cannot be denied that [Section] l's focus on concerted behavior leaves a "gap"
in the Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade. An
unreasonable restraint of trade may be effected not only by two independent
firms acting in concert; a single firm may restrain trade to precisely the same
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This "gap" has been used to argue that monopolistic leveraging, in and
of itself, is not a violation of the Act.2 ' To recover under a Section 2
claim of monopolization, the plaintiff must show that a company
possesses monopoly power in a relevant market and that such power was
willfully acquired or maintained, rather than the result "of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.",2 ' A claim of attempted
monopolization includes three elements: (1) specific intent to
monopolize, (2) predatory or anti-competitive conduct to monopolize
that market, and (3) a high probability that the firm will succeed in
achieving monopoly power. 2' In contrast, the elements of a Section 2
monopolistic leveraging claim include: "(1) monopoly power in one
market, (2) the use of that power... to gain a competitive advantage in
another distinct market, and (3) injury caused by the challenged
conduct." 3 The controversial difference between monopolization,
attempted monopolization, and monopolistic leveraging - when
asserted as a violation in itself - is that leveraging requires a goal of
gaining only a competitive advantage, whereas the other two claims
extent if it alone possesses the combined market power of those same two firms.
Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade as
such - but only restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy - it
leaves untouched a single firm's anti-competitive conduct (short of threatened
monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the
conduct of two firms subject to [Section] 1 liability.
Id. at 774-75 (citation omitted); see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948
F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1991); Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 376 (asserting that Section
2 liability traditionally required more than predatory actions and anticompetitive intent);
Joseph M. Callow, Jr., Cut-Throat Competition in the Friendly Skies. Alaska Airlines v.
United Airlines, 61 U. GIN. L. REv. 681, 686 (1992) (noting that concerted activity that
merely restrains trade is prohibited under Section 1, while individual conduct must reach
the level of monopolization or attempted monopolization for it to be a violation of Section
2).
20. Fineman v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 205 (3rd Cir. 1992)
(noting that Sections 1 and 2 do not make all anticompetitive conduct unlawful and
arguing that "Berkey Photo's formulation of monopoly leveraging to proscribe unilateral
restraints of trade does violence to the text of the Sherman Act and decimates this "gap"
in liability").
21. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 541 (citing United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563,
570-71 (1966) as quoted in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585,
596 n.19 (1985)).
See generally Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of
Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 693 (2000) (discussing the elements required for a
monopolization claim).
22. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 542; Callow, supra note 19, at 687. See generally
Muris, supra note 21 (discussing the elements required for attempted monopolization
claims and the evidence used by the FFC in establishing them).
23. Willman v. Heartland Hospital East, 34 F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir. 1994); Callow,
supra note 19, at 686.
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require a purpose of gaining or maintaining monopoly power.24 The
monopolistic leveraging claim extends the reach of Section 2 to situations
in which the firm may not be seeking to monopolize and may not even
control a significant percentage of the second market8
This Comment examines the history of the monopolistic leveraging
doctrine and its place in antitrust law. It first discusses the origin and
development of the doctrine in case law. Next, this Comment analyzes
the rationale used by courts to both sustain and reject the leveraging
theory and examines the debate over the theory's economic viability.
Finally, this Comment asserts that the Supreme Court should settle this
area of antitrust law by holding that leveraging is a violation under
Section 2 only when it is a means by which a firm attempts to monopolize
or maintain its current monopoly. Additionally, this Comment argues
that special consideration must be made when applying the leveraging
theory in dynamic network markets.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE MONOPOLISTIC LEVERAGING DOCTRINE

A. The Birth and Development of the Leveraging Theory
The monopolistic leveraging doctrine dates back to the Supreme
Court's 1948 decision in United States v. Griffith.26 In Griffith, the Court
held that a monopoly could not be used "to beget monopoly."2'7 The
strongest support for the leveraging doctrine came in the Court's dictum,
where it stated that it is a violation to use even lawfully acquired
monopoly power to restrain competition, gain a competitive advantage,
or eliminate a competitor 8
It was not until Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.29 that the
monopolistic leveraging doctrine was recognized as a separate claim

24. Willow A. Sheremata, Barriersto Innovation:A Monopoly, Network Externalities,
and the Speed of Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 937, 945 (1997) (acknowledging that
monopoly leveraging to gain a competitive advantage, as opposed to monopolization or
attempted monopolization, is a "contentious area of antitrust law").
25. Ass'n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. N.C.A.A., 735 F.2d 577, 586
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
26. 334 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1948) (finding that a movie exhibitor violated Section 2 by
acquiring exclusive distribution rights for a group of cities, including some in which it had
a significant market share); see James P. Puhala, I, Note, Berkey Photo and Alaska
Airlines: Different Approaches to Monopoly Leveraging Claims, 16 W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 111, 117-18 (1994) (discussing Griffith in the context of monopoly leveraging).
27. Griffith, 334 U.S. at 108.
28. Id. at 107.
29. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1.093 (1980).
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under Section 2." In Berkey Photo, the Second Circuit acknowledged
that using monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive
advantage in another is a violation of Section 2, notwithstanding that no
attempt was made to monopolize the second market." Berkey, a small
company in the camera industry, brought suit against its competitor
Kodak, claiming that Kodak used its monopoly in the film, color paper,
and camera markets to gain an advantage in the photofinishing and
services markets.32 The allegations stemmed from Kodak's introduction
of the 110 "Pocket Instamatic" camera and the fact that only Kodak
produced film compatible with the camera.
Berkey argued that
independent photofinishers could not compete until they purchased new
equipment and received training from Kodak on the new processing."
The court did not decide the question of whether Kodak engaged in
monopolistic leveraging, but, after stating that such leveraging is a
violation of Section 2, it held that a new trial was necessary to fully
resolve the issue.35
The court reasoned that because it was a violation of the Act to use
monopoly power to further existing monopolies, it would also be a
violation for Kodak to use its market power to achieve a competitive
advantage in a second market. 6 In the court's view, the issue was the
improper use of monopoly power, as opposed to the fear of
monopolization of a second market.37 The court's decision extended the
30. See id. at 267-68, 276.
31. Id. at 276.
32. Id. at 267-69. Berkey operated in both the camera and photofinishing markets
but relied heavily on Kodak for supplies and equipment. Id. at 267. Berkey argued that
Kodak leveraged its monopoly power in the film market to manufacture film that was only
compatible with Kodak's cameras and that Kodak refused to provide competitors with
information to produce similar film. Id. at 267-68.
33. Id. at 268-69; Puhala, supra note 26, at 120.
34. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 290.
35. Id. at 291-92. The court stated that Kodak's competitive advantage may have
been the result of innovation, rather than its monopoly power, but it could not dismiss the
possibility that Kodak's monopoly power in other markets was the source of its ability to
gain an advantage over its competitors. Id. at 292. The court concluded by saying that it
was unable to resolve the ambiguity. Id.
36. Id. at 275.
37. See id. The court stated:
We tolerate the existence of monopoly power, we repeat, only insofar as
necessary to preserve competitive incentives and to be fair to the firm that has
attained its position innocently. There is no reason to allow the exercise of such
power to the detriment of competition, in either the controlled market or any
other. That the competition in the leveraged market may not be destroyed but
merely distorted does not make it more palatable. Social and economic effects of
an extension of monopoly power militate against such conduct.
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reach of the Act to include unilateral acts that did not rise to the level of
monopolization or attempted monopolization, thereby narrowing the
aforementioned "gap. ' 8 Prior to this decision, a Section 2 violation
required general intent for a monopolization claim39 and specific intent
for an attempted monopolization claim. 40 The Berkey Photo court
removed the element of intent that is required for a monopolization or
attempted monopolization claim, thus making it easier for a firm to
violate the Sherman Act'
B. The CircuitSplit on the Monopolistic Leveraging Issue
Courts have understood Berkey Photo as creating a distinct
monopolistic leveraging claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 42 The
monopolistic leveraging claim has received both approval and criticism
from courts and commentators. 43 A split 44 resulted among the federal
Id.
38. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
39. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 417 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating
that the demand for specific intent was nonsense). The opinion of the Second Circuit,
written by Judge Hand, carries the weight of a Supreme Court case, in terms of its
precedential value. See PHILIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 77-78 (1967). When the
case was appealed to the Supreme Court, four justices recused themselves, preventing a
quorum; therefore, the Court certified the case and allowed it to be heard by the three
most senior circuit judges. Id. Judge Hand's analysis regarding the intent requirement for
monopolization claims was criticized by Professor Robert Bork. ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 165-69 (1978); see also Puhala, supra note 26, at 119-20 (arguing
that requiring only general intent makes it easier for a court to find a violation of the
Sherman Act because the court can concern itself with only market influence).
40. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (requiring specific
intent to monopolize for a finding of attempted monopolization); see also Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985); Puhala, supra note 26, at
119-20 (noting that "because there is no established monopoly upon which [the analysis
can] focus, specific intent is required for a finding of attempted monopolization).
41. Puhala, supra note 26, at 114.
42. Callow, supra note 19, at 697; see, e.g., Kerasotes Michigan Theatres v. Nat'l
Amusements, 854 F.2d 135, 136-37 (6th Cir. 1988); Grand Light & Supply Co. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 1985); M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 691 F.2d
1303, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982); Soap Opera Now, Inc. v. Network Publ'g Corp., 737 F. Supp.
1338, 1348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F.
Supp. 1504,1512-15 (E.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986).
43. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455,
463-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (outlining the split in the courts on the issue of monopoly
leveraging); Dolan, supra note 2, at 978 (noting that courts disagree about whether a firm
can violate Section 2 through leveraging for a competitive advantage or whether proof of a
traditional claim of monopolization or attempted monopolization is required); see PHILLIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 652 (2002). For a discussion of
differing approaches by the courts, see infra notes 50-85 and accompanying text.
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appellate courts: some endorsed the claim, 45 some rejected it,4 6 and other
courts evaded the issue altogether.47
In Associationfor IntercollegiateAthletics for Women v. N.C.A.A.,4 the
first major decision addressing monopolistic leveraging after the Berkey
decision, the District of Columbia Circuit refused to rule on the issue.49
The court referenced the "substantial academic criticism" surrounding
the leveraging theory and opted to reserve the issue for a case in which a
decision as to the legal sufficiency of such a claim was essential.
In Kerasotes Michigan Theatres v. National Amusements, Inc.,' the
Sixth Circuit followed the Second Circuit's lead in Berkey Photo and
acknowledged the existence of the leveraging doctrine as a separate and
distinct theory of recovery under the Sherman Act."
National
Amusements brought suit alleging that the defendant used its dominance
in other geographical areas to gain a competitive advantage. 3 While
there was no claim of monopolization or even attempted
monopolization, the court reversed the lower court's dismissal.-"
Reasoning that leveraging market power to gain a competitive advantage
in a second market may allow inferior products to gain prominence and
44. See, e.g., Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Texas State Soccer Ass'n, 213 F.3d 198, 206 n.16
(5th Cir. 2000) (stating in a footnote that the monopolistic leveraging theory is the subject
of a circuit split); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(commenting that monopoly leveraging arose out of the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Griffith and was endorsed by the Second Circuit, but it was later rejected
by other circuits); J. Neil Lombardo, Resuscitating Monopoly Leveraging: Strategic
Business Behavior and Its Implications for the Proper Treatment of Unilateral
Anticompetitive Conduct Under Federal Antitrust Laws, 41 ST. Louis L.J. 387, 406-08
(1996) (discussing the disagreement among the circuits as to whether leveraging is a
Section 2 violation).
45. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text; Patrick Lynch, Monopolization,
Attempted Monopolization and Joint Ventures, 1251 PLI/CORP 279 (2001) (noting that
some circuits have rejected the monopoly leveraging theory when the monopoly was
lawfully achieved and the element of "dangerous probability" had not been met for an
attempted monopolization claim).
47. See infra notes 56-59, 80-87, 100-07 and accompanying text.
48. 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 586 n.14.
50.

Id.; see also

RiCHARD

A. POSNER &

FRANK

H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST:

802-10, 870-71 (2d ed. 1981); BORK,
supra note 39, at 372-75; Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American
Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195, 199-205 (1970); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying
Arrangementsand the Leverage Problem,67 YALE L.J. 19, 21-29 (1957).
51. 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 136-37.
53. Id. at 136.
54. Id. at 137-38.
CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS
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disrupt competition, the court found that such acts are a violation of
Section 2."
In its most recent decision addressing the leveraging question, M&M
Medical Supplies and Service, Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc., 6 the
Fourth Circuit assumed that the claim is proper for the sake of argument
but reserved judgment on the issue for a later case.57 The court
referenced an earlier decision in which it upheld a leveraging claim but,
at the same time, expressly reserved judgment for an opportunity in
which the "the issue is squarely presented." ' However, while the court
avoided judgment on this issue, it instructed that for purposes of remand,
the assumption is that monopoly leveraging is a separate violation of
Section 2. 9
The Ninth and Third Circuits rejected the leveraging theory outright.
In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,"' the Ninth Circuit held
that in order to establish a violation of Section 2 the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant "used its monopoly power in one market to obtain or61
attempt to attain a monopoly in the downstream, or leveraged, market.",
In doing so, the Ninth Circuit limited Section 2 violations to the
traditional monopolization and attempted monopolization claims, and it
refused to recognize the monopolistic leveraging claim established in
Berkey Photo.62
In its most recent leveraging case, Fineman v. Armstrong World
Industries,Inc.,63 the Third Circuit stated that the Berkey decision relied
on dictum in the Supreme Court's Griffith decision and that the broad
statement articulated in Griffith should not control its decision in
Fineman.6 Accordingly, the court sided with the Ninth Circuit and held
that in order to succeed in a leveraging claim, the plaintiff must establish
55. Id. ("Products that may be inferior should not be allowed to prosper in a
particular market as a result of its producer's exploitation of its monopoly position in a
second market.").
56. 981 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992).
57. Id. at 169.
5& Id. (quoting Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d
139, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1990)).
59. Id.
60. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 547-49 (rejecting a monopolistic leveraging claim); see also Callow, supra
note 19, at 713.
62 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547, 549; see also Puhala, supra note 26, at 133
(describing the court's treatment of traditional Section 2 claims and the rejection of the
monopoly leveraging claim articulated in Berkey).
63. 980 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1992).
64. Id. at 205-206.
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either a threatened or actual monopoly - the standard required for
monopolization or attempted monopolization. 65
C. The Supreme Court Adds to the Confusion
The Supreme Court encountered the leveraging issue for the second
time in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.66 The
plaintiff claimed that Kodak used its dominance in the manufacturing of
replacement copier parts to gain a monopoly in the market of copier
repair.67 While it was not discussed in the body of the opinion, the Court
endorsed the Berkey articulation of the leveraging doctrinei6 The Court
stated that antitrust liability may result when a firm uses its monopoly
69
power in one market "to achieve a competitive advantage in another.,
However, in Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan,7" decided only a year after
Eastman Kodak, the Court expressed a view that appears to contradict
its previous comments on leveraging. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant violated both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act by
granting one distributor a monopoly on the distribution of sorbothane, a
foam padding used in sports equipment. 7' Although the Court did not
address leveraging in its holding, in dictum it seemed to reject the
theory.' The Court stated that the conduct of a single firm only violates
Section 2 when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to
monopolize the second market.73 Clearly influenced by the Chicago
School's approach to antitrust policy, 7 4 the Court reasoned that the
Sherman Act's purpose was to prohibit activities that unfairly restrain75
competition rather than to protect businesses from competition entirely.
The Court's concern was that reading the Act more broadly might result
65. Id. at 206.
66. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
67. Id. at 459.
6& See id. at 479-80 n.29 (stating that a firm's market power can give rise to liability if
it is exploited for the purpose of "expand[ing] ...[the firm's] empire into the next").
69. See id.; see also Lombardo, supra note 44, at 408.
70. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
71. Id. at 449-51.
72. Id. at 459. The Court held that Spectrum could not be liable for attempted
monopolization without proof of a "dangerous probability" that it would achieve
monopolization and that it had the specific intent to do so. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE (1976). Chicago School economists claim that because there is no net gain
from monopolistic leveraging, firms engaging in leveraging activities do so for procompetitive or neutral reasons. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
75. Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 458.
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in firms being found in violation of Section 2 for conduct that enhances,
rather than prohibits, competition. v6
D. The CircuitsHesitate To Rule Amid Uncertainty
In its most recent discussion of the issue, the Eleventh Circuit, while
not expressly endorsing the theory, recognized the plaintiff's claim of
monopolistic leveraging under Section 2 in Aquatherm Industries, Inc. v.
Florida Power & Light Co. 7 The court held that the plaintiff failed to
show that the defendant sought a competitive advantage in the second
market," an element clearly established by the standard set forth in
Berkey.79
In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,"' the Federal Circuit, citing an
earlier decision by the Eleventh Circuit and quoting from an earlier
Supreme Court opinion,8 dismissed a claim of monopolistic leveraging
because the second market was highly competitive and the leveraging
conduct affected only one competitor." The Federal Circuit quoted the
Supreme Court, which maintained that leveraging is not illegal unless "a
significant fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a market."" The
Federal Circuit then accordingly held that, based on the standard set by
the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, the instant claim was not
supported'" The court avoided articulating its own position on the
monopolistic leveraging issue.
In Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Texas State Soccer Ass'n,8' the Fifth
Circuit expressly declined to rule on the monopolistic leveraging theory
and acknowledged the circuit split on the issue.6 Recognizing the
complexity and disagreement associated with the leveraging doctrine, the
76. Id. (noting that the courts have been cautious to avoid interpreting Section 2 of
the Sherman Act in way that "might chill competition, rather than foster it").
77. 145 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to extend the monopolistic
leveraging claim to include situations in which the monopolist uses its power in a market
that it does not seek to monopolize or even compete against).
7& Id.
79. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
80. 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
81.
Id. at 1360 (citing Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1503
(11th Cir. 1.985) and quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
8Z
Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1360.
83. Id. at 1360 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 45 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
84. Id.
85. 213 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 206 n.16.
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court opted to rest its judgment on the issue of damages presented in the
case and avoided the antitrust claims altogether. 7
E. Most Recent Approachies to the Leveraging Issue
While many circuits were avoiding the issue," the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia used the leveraging theory in a
widely publicized case. 9 In United States v. Microsoft Corp.," the court
found that Microsoft leveraged its monopoly power in the market for
operating systems 9 to increase its browser9' market share and thus
protect its operating systems monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the

87. Id. at 206.
88. See supra notes 56-59, 80-87 and accompanying text.
89. See generally David S. Evans, Albert L. Nichols & Richard Schmalensee, An
Analysis of the Government's Economic Case in U.S. v. Microsoft, 46 ANTITRUST BULL.
163 (2001); Jonathan Krim, Microsoft, US. Near Antitrust Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov.
1, 2001, at Al.
90. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The case referred to in the text is the appellate
decision in the case commonly known as "Microsoft III." See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An
Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 1,
3 (1998). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the District of Columbia, and a coalition
of states brought the cases, which were consolidated into Microsoft III. Evans, Nichols &
Schmalensee, supra note 89, at 163 n.1. Previously, the DOJ had sued Microsoft in 1995
(Microsoft I) and again in 1998 (Microsoft 11). See id. In Microsoft I, the DOJ charged
that Microsoft had engaged in various practices constituting unlawful monopolization and
unreasonable restraint of trade under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Piraino, supra,
at 3. The suit was settled with a consent decree that was formulated to prevent Microsoft
from engaging in leveraging its monopoly in the operating systems market to obtain an
advantage over its competitors in the applications and browser markets. United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1995). The decree barred Microsoft from
requiring purchasers of operating systems licenses to also purchase licenses for Microsoft
applications. Id. at 338. In Microsoft II, the DOJ charged that Microsoft violated the
consent decree by requiring that computer manufacturers purchasing licenses to install
Windows 95 also accept Microsoft's "Explorer" Internet browser. United States v.
Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D.D.C. 1997). The DOJ argued that "[b]y tying the two
products together, Microsoft would be able to extend its monopoly [in the market] for
operating systems into the market for Internet browsers." Piraino, supra, at 4. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that no illegal tying arrangement
existed because the two products were integrated, precluding a finding that the supplier
marketed two separate products, which was a requirement for such a violation. United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950-52 (D.C. Cir. 1998). For a detailed discussion
of the use of the tying theory in Microsoft II, see Piraino, supra, at 4-6.
91. An operating system "controls the computer hardware [by] send[ing] instructions
to the microprocessor to perform calculations and to move information to the hard disks
and other storage devices." Evans, Nichols & Schmalensee, supra note 89, at 171.
92. An internet browser is "software that enables users to navigate the World Wide
Web and to display files in the HTML format that has become standard on the Web." Id.

2002]

Monopolistic Leveraging Theory and Antitrust Law

Sherman Act.93 Specifically, Microsoft used its power in the operating
systems market through the integration of Internet Explorer (IE) into
Windows, 94 the use of license restrictions," the exclusion of IE from the
"Add/Remove" utility, and the commingling of the operating system

93. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 71. Although the appellate court upheld the district
court's finding of unlawful monopoly maintenance in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87
F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000), the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia overturned the trial court's finding of attempted
monopolization. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 80, 84. The appellate court found that the
government essentially made the same argument under both the monopolization charge
and the attempt charge and the government had not carried its burden on the issue of
whether there was a dangerous probability of success in Microsoft's attempt to
monopolize the browser market. Id. at 81. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia remanded the case on the tying allegation, holding that the rule of reason,
rather than the per se rule, should have been applied. Id. at 94. The court vacated the
divestiture remedy prescribed by the trial court, which specifically required that Microsoft
be split into an operating systems organization and a browser organization. Id. at 97-100.
In addition, the trial judge was found to have committed several ethical violations. Id. at
107. As a result, the case was remanded to the district court for reassignment to a
different trial judge. Id. at 118-19. The Justice Department and Microsoft reached a
settlement agreement that did not require a break up of the company, but rather forced it
to "play nice and share." Ariana Eunjung Cha, Accord Called Win for Software Giant,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2001, at El. However, the District of Columbia and nine of the
states that had joined the Department of Justice in the suit against Microsoft rejected the
proposed settlement and stated that they intended to seek tougher sanctions. Jonathan
Krim & Ariana Eunjung Cha, 9 States, D.C. Reject Microsoft Settlement, WASH. POST,
Nov. 7, 2001, at El. Those efforts failed and the judge formally approved the settlement
on November 12, 2002. Jonathan Krim, Legal Wars Have Changed Microsoft, CEO Says,
WASH. POST, Nov. 13,2002, at E6.
94. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 64. The court noted that while Microsoft made some
general claims as to the benefits of integrating the operating system and browser, the
claims were not specific, nor were they substantiated. Id. at 62-63; see also Evans, Nichols
& Schmalensee, supra note 89, at 172 (arguing that "[a] browser is a natural addition to an
operating system" because its functionality relative to the web is similar to the way that an
operating system obtains information from sources and storage media and, likewise, "it
enables software developers to access files and.., features that can be used in conjunction
with the web").
95. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 59-62. The court found that Microsoft's license
restriction that prohibited Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) "from removing
visible means of user access to [Internet Explorer] . . .prevents many OEMs from preinstalling a rival browser and therefore protects Microsoft's [operating system] monopoly
from competition that middleware might otherwise present. Id. at 61. The court rejected
Microsoft's justifications for the restrictions and determined that the restrictions had anticompetitive effects and Microsoft had used its monopoly power to maintain its monopoly
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 62-64.
96. Id. at 65. Microsoft included Internet Explorer in the "Add/Remove Programs"
utility in Windows 95, but omitted it in Windows 98. Id. at 65. The court found that the
change "discourag[ed original equipment manufacturers] from distributing rival
products." Id.
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and the browser code.7 In a separate claim, the government asserted
that Microsoft had leveraged its operating system monopoly in an
attempt to monopolize the browser market. 98 While the appellate court
reversed the district court's determination of liability under Section 2 on
that claim, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the argument was
essentially the same as the one asserted in the monopoly maintenance
claim.s'
In the most recent discussion of leveraging, in Virgin Atlantic Airways,
Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, the Second Circuit recognized uncertainty
surrounding the scope and legitimacy of a monopolistic leveraging claim
as an independent cause of action.1° After recognizing that some doubt
existed as to the continued applicability of the leveraging theory in
AD/SAT v. Associated Press,"" the Virgin Atlantic Airways court
acknowledged the detrimental impact of the Supreme Court's decision in
Spectrum Sports'°2 on the monopolistic leveraging theory."" The court
stated that Spectrum Sports raises the standard for a Section 2 violation
beyond gaining a competitive advantage because it requires actual, or a
97. Id. at 65-66. The government alleged, and the district court found, that Microsoft
included "code specific to Web browsing in the same files as code that provided operating
system functions." Id. at 65. This mechanism prevented the removal of Microsoft's
browser because doing so would effectively cripple the operating system. Id. at 65-66.
Microsoft argued that the code was essential to both the operating system and the
browser; thus, its location was essential. Id. at 66. The appellate court rejected
Microsoft's argument and upheld the finding that the commingling of code had anticompetitive effects. Id.
98. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 47. The government claimed that Microsoft engaged in
predatory behavior by compensating AOL to encourage its use of Internet Explorer, by
proposing to divide the market with competitor Netscape, by offering consideration to
Internet Service Providers that distribute Internet Explorer, and by providing the browser
at no cost. Evans, Nichols & Schmalensee, supra note 89, at 163, 166, 181, 183. The
district court found that Microsoft's actions, which also formed the basis for the
monopolization liability, "warrant[ed] additional liability as an illegal attempt to amass
monopoly power in 'the browser market."' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp.

2d 30, 45 (D.D.C. 2000).
99. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80-81.
100. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. British Airways, PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir.
2001) (referencing the Berkey Photo monopoly leveraging standard and noting that the
court has questioned this proposition since its inception).
101. 181 F.3d 216, 230 (2d Cir. 1.999).
102. Spectrum Sports v. McQuilliam, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
103. Virgin Atlantic Airways, 257 F.3d at 272. Virgin Atlantic brought suit against
British Airways under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 259. Virgin
argued that British Airways engaged in predatory anti-competitive conduct through the
use of its incentive agreements with travel agencies and corporate customers, and as a
result, Virgin's efforts to extend its services to routes between the United Kingdom and
the United States were inhibited. Id. at 259.
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dangerous threat of, monopolization. "
The court then went on to
specify the elements of a claim for monopoly leveraging'o' and
determined that the plaintiffs did not meet the required burdenY' 6 In the
end, the Second Circuit, which once championed the monopoly
leveraging theory as a claim under Section 2, declined to decide its
continued viabilityi17
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEVERAGING THEORY CASE LAW AND THE
ENSUING ECONOMIC DEBATE
A.

The Courts' Rationale

The monopoly leverage doctrine developed as a distinct Section 2
claim when plaintiffs found themselves victims of a monopolist's use of
its power to harm or destroy a competitor in another market."" In
response to this development, the courts often turned to the purpose of
the Sherman Act to either promote or criticize the theory.'"
The rationale of the court in Berkey Photo, the first case to delineate
the elements of a Section 2 monopolistic leveraging claim, " ° was based
on the idea that regulation of monopoly power itself was the aim of
104. Id. at 272 (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d
Cir. 1979)).
105. Id. The Second Circuit required proof of: (1) monopoly power in one market,
(2) use of that power to gain competitive advantage in a separate market, and (3) injury
resulting from the anticompetitive conduct. Id. (citing AD/SAT, 181 F.3d at 230).
106. Id. at 272-73.
107. Id. at 272. The Second Circuit held that Virgin lacked proof as to the markets in
which British Airways actually possessed monopoly power and as to the markets in which
British Airways sought a competitive advantage. Id. at 273. The court then affirmed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment on the issue. Id.
108. Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 377 (suggesting that plaintiffs with no
traditional Section 2 remedy sought to fashion a new, independent theory that excused the
traditional requirement of monopoly power or the dangerous probability of achieving it in
the leveraged market).
109. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting that the Sherman Act exists to punish a firm using predatory means to attain or
perpetuate a monopoly); Kerasotes Michigan Theatres v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 854
F.2d 135, 137-38 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Sherman Act was formulated to prohibit
conduct tending to create a monopoly, even if the tendency is only a "creeping one");
Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at n.15 (asserting that "monopoly power itself is the target of
[Section] 2").
110. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276 ("Accordingly, the use of monopoly power attained
in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of § 2, even if there
has not been an attempt to monopolize the second market."); Puhala, supra note 26, at 124
(attributing the foundation of the monopoly leveraging doctrine to the Second Circuit's
decision in Berkey Photo, specifically citing the court's warning that some anti-competitive
activities are only possible if taken by a firm in a dominant market position).
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Section 2."' In a footnote, the Second Circuit made this "revolutionary"
argument very clear:
We cannot accept Kodak's argument that, read literally, section
2 prevents a plaintiff from recovering unless there was at least
an attempt to monopolize the market in which it claims to have
been injured. Since monopoly power itself is the target of §2, it
is unreasonable to suggest that a firm that possesses such power
in one market and uses it to damage competition in another
2
does not "monopolize" within the meaning of the statute."
This statement was a divergence from earlier case law, which found that
only monopolization and attempted monopolization violate Section 2.13
When monopoly leveraging was accepted as a distinct Section 2 claim,
it was because Section 2 was interpreted as completely prohibiting
conduct that tends toward creating a monopoly."4 Courts used the
monopolistic leveraging doctrine to distinguish fair competition, which is
taking advantage of efficient operations and technological innovations,
from unfair competition, which is monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize through predatory means."5 The distinction the courts
sought to draw was a fine one, and their inherent distrust of the use of
monopoly power led to the
6 fashioning of the new, less stringent claim of
leveraging.'
monopolistic
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to reject explicitly the
monopolistic leveraging doctrine." 7 After first trying to evade the issue,
the court was squarely presented with it in Alaska Airlines."8 The Ninth
Circuit examined the purpose of Section 2 and its traditional claims
before coming to the conclusion that a monopolistic leveraging claim was
inappropriate and unnecessary.119
111. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276 n.15.
112. Id. See generally Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 371.
113. See Puhala, supra note 26, at 114 (discussing the history of Section 2
interpretation and acknowledging that Berkey Photo "made it easier for a firm to fall
within the violative scope of the Sherman Act").
114. Kerasotes Michigan Theatres,854 F.2d at 137.
115. PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 652a (2002).
116. See Azcuenaga, supra note 1, at *5 (noting that less rigorous proof is required to
establish a monopolistic leveraging claim).
117. See Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
118. Callow, supra note 19, at 703. Syufy Enters. v. American Multicinema, Inc., 793
F.2d 990, 998 n.10 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (stating that "the court
need not enter into the debate concerning the anticompetitive effects of leveraging"
because there was insufficient proof that the defendant used monopoly power).
119. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 548-49. The court emphasized that the Sherman Act
sought to prevent creation, or attempted creation, of monopolies through monopoly
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The court emphasized that the purpose of Section 2 was to prevent
monopolization in a given market.2 0 The court also noted that the Act
does not prohibit all monopolies; instead, it allows monopolies deemed
to be natural or acquired through superior skill and foresight. 2 ' In the
Ninth Circuit's view, while traditional claims of monopolization and
attempted monopolization differentiate between allowable and
prohibited monopolies, monopoly leveraging does not and is therefore
inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.'22
While the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that monopolistic
leveraging constituted a separate claim under Section 2,' 3 it agreed that
leveraging was one way in which a monopolist could exercise its power
and achieve additional benefits. 24 In doing so, the court implicitly
rejected the economic theory asserted by the Chicago School analysts,
who believed that it was impossible to gain additional benefits by
leveraging monopoly power.' z
Rather, the court ruled that such

leveraging; if there is a dangerous probability that a monopoly would result from such
activity, the conduct is circumscribed under traditional Section 2 claims. Id. at 549.
120. See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 546-47.
121. Id. at 547-48.
122. Id. at 548. The court stated:
Berkey Photo's monopoly leveraging doctrine fails to differentiate properly
among monopolies. The anti-competitive dangers that implicate the Sherman
Act are not present when a monopolist has a lawful monopoly in one market and
uses its power to gain a competitive advantage in the second market. By
definition, the monopolist has failed to gain, or attempt to gain, a monopoly in
the second market. Thus, such activity fails to meet the second element
necessary to establish a violation of Section 2. Unless the monopolist uses its
power in the first market to acquire and maintain a monopoly in the second
market, or attempt to do so, there is no Section 2 violation.
Id.
123. Id. at 547 (unequivocally rejecting the monopoly leveraging doctrine established
in Berkey Photo as an independent theory of Section 2 liability); see also Callow, supra
note 19, at 703-05.
124. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 548. The court stated that "[m]onopoly leveraging is
just one of a number of ways that a monopolist can permissibly benefit from its position."
Id.
125. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text;
RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 172-73 (1976) (presenting a hypothetical
to demonstrate the view that a monopolist cannot gain additional profits from leveraging
its monopoly in a second market; see also BORK, supra note 39, at 140 (referring to
traditional leverage theory as "the fallacy of double counting"). For another example of a
court following the logic of the Chicago School, see Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1203 (3d Cir. 1995), suggesting that monopoly leveraging
claims are economically questionable and based on analysis "akin to the myth that a
monopolist can charge any price it wants."
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activities are prohibited by traditional Section 2 claims; thus, an
additional claim was unnecessary.126
The Third Circuit also expressly rejected the doctrine, adopting a
rationale similar to that of the Ninth Circuit.1 7 The court held that as a
matter of law, a leveraging claim could not stand without proof of actual
monopolization or a dangerous probability of it in the second market.""
Thus, the Third Circuit recognized only traditional Section 2 claims.
Courts that rejected the leveraging claim struggled with the foundation
of the leveraging doctrine, many of them noting that it originated in
dictum." 9 Essentially, the theory arose out of the Supreme Court's broad
statements about monopoly power in an early antitrust case.
Nonetheless, proponents of the monopolistic leveraging claim continue
to point to the Court's early
and uncharacteristically broad language to
31
support their argument.
B. The Economic Debate

From its inception, leading economists debated the leveraging
theory. 32 Initially, they accepted the courts' rationale that the

126. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549; see Callow, supranote 19, at 705.
127. Fineman v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 206 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993). The Fineman court referenced the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Alaska Airlines, which had also relied on a distinction between Section 1 and
Section 2 liability, and stated that its decision was "in concert" with the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Id.
128. Id. at 203.
129. Id. at 205-06 (stating that the Berkey Photo court relied on dicta in United States
v. Griffith for the foundation of its monopoly leveraging rule); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (describing the statement in Griffith as
"dictum"); AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 230 (2d Cir. 1999) (referring to the
court's statements in Berkey Photo as dictum); Willman v. Heartland Hosp. E., 836 F.
Supp. 1522, 1534 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (noting that the Second Circuit stated that the
acknowledgement of a claim for monopoly leveraging was dictum); Joseph Kattan, The
Decline of the Monopoly LeveragingDoctrine,in ANTITRUST 41 (1994) (characterizing the
Court's statements in Griffith as dictum).
130. Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107-08 (explaining that monopoly power cannot be used "to
beget monopoly" or "to gain a competitive advantage").
131. The language in Griffith and Berkey Photo followed from Judge Learned Hand's
statements in United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945). Justice Hand asserted that it is preferable to have a system of small producers to
one in which there are a few that can control the market, even at the expense of efficiency.
Id. at 427. Courts that endorsed the theory that monopoly leveraging to gain competitive
advantage is a Section 2 violation mirror this harsh approach.
132. BORK, supra note 39, at 372-73; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 10.10 (4th ed. 1992); Markovitz, supra note 50, at 196.
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detrimental effects of leveraging were obvious.' However, the Chicago
School' 3 of economists challenged the theory as being presumptuous, if
not impossible.'35 In recent years, however, economists have been
returning to populist notions of economics, arguing that there may in fact
be circumstances in which leveraging monopoly power may be both
beneficial to the monopolist and detrimental to society. 136
The traditional leverage theory asserts that when a monopolist uses its
power in its own market to control activities in a separate market, the37
monopolist is attempting to extend its power into the second market.
The traditional argument assumed that two monopolies create more
monopoly profits than a single monopoly, resulting in more economic
damage.'3 6 The economic view of such activities is that a firm with
monopoly power in one market may, through certain practices in another
market, be able to impose a "deadweight welfare loss" upon society from
which they gain profits. 39 The basic argument is that a dominant firm
may reduce output and increase price without actual or threatened
133. Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079,
2079-80 (1999) (stating that in the first half of the century, monopoly leveraging was
viewed as threatening to competition by courts, commentators, and legislators and
suggesting that the assumption that two monopolies would create more economic damage
than one seemed so intuitive that economists did not debate it initially).
134. The Chicago School has been described as "those who maintain that most
behavior by firms is better explained as attempts to improve the efficiency of operations
rather than as monopolizing, and who believe that where attained, market power erodes
reasonably quickly." Richard 0. Zerbe and Michael T. Mumford, "Does Predatory
Pricing Exist? Economic Theory and the Courts After Brooke Group, 41 ANTITRUST
BULL., 949, 983 (1996); see also Lombardo, supra note 44, at 387 nn. 2, 147, 193, 211
(describing the general teachings of the Chicago School, its history, and its views on
monopoly leveraging); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Theory and Fact in Antitrust Doctrine.
Summary Judgment Standards, Single-Brand Aftermarkets and the Clash of
Microeconomic Models, 45 ANTITRUST BULL., 887, 915-17 (2000) (outlining the
foundations of the Chicago School).
135. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 932
(2001). Posner stated that the Chicago School approach is skeptical about the harm to
competition posed by unilateral action. He noted that the Chicago School approach
recognizes that it is difficult to eliminate competition through unilateral action and that
rigid antitrust enforcement may suppress a practice that is actually efficient, rather than
anti-competitive. Id.
136. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the
Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 844 (2000) (proposing that when a monopolist
leverages market power from one market into another, it can achieve additional profits
without providing consumers more efficiency benefits and therefore such conduct should
be viewed as a violation of Section 2 as an attempt to monopolize).
137. Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Though Leverage, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 515, 516 (1985).
138. Feldman, supranote 133, at 2080.
139. Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 388.
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monopoly.'" The monopolistic behavior will trigger "a loss in consumer
surplus because consumers value the lost output.., more than the cost to
society of producing that output."'' 4' Producer surplus is also reduced
because the cost of producing the lost output is less than its market
value. 42 The net result is social welfare loss, which, according to some
economists,
may be substantial even absent a traditional Section 2
43
violation.'
Leading Chicago School economists have criticized the leveraging

theory.' 44 The basis of their view is that a firm with monopoly power may
be able to gain profits from its own market, a second market, or a
combination of the two, "but the total amount of restriction that the
monopolist will profitably be able to impose is fixed.' ' 45 Judge Posner, a
leading member of the Chicago School,' 46 questioned what incentive a
firm with a monopoly in one market would whave to extend that
monopoly to additional products because without price discrimination, a
monopolist will gain nothing by monopolizing a complementary
market. 14 Proponents of this position showed that a monopolist cannot
increase prices in a secondary market without losing profits in its primary
market; thus, there is no net gain and no additional economic damage
from leveraging. '48 The Chicago School believes, therefore,14 that a
monopolist will leverage for pro-competitive or neutral reasons. 1
Post-Chicago School economic analysis'5 ° has turned away from broad

generalizations and has focused instead on intricate fact finding. 5 ' This
140. Id. at 388, 390. Blair and Esquibel provide a detailed analysis of traditional
economic thought regarding the dangers of monopolistic leveraging. Id. at 388-95. They
argue that without the leveraging doctrine, there is a gap in the protection of consumers in
the antitrust laws. Id. at 395.
141. Id. at 390.
142. Id. For a detailed discussion on the economic arguments made in support of and
in opposition to the leveraging theory, see generally Kaplow, supra note 137.
143. Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 394-95; see Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 2080
(arguing that leveraging can have anti-competitive effects if it enables a dominant firm to
raise its competitors' economic costs of competing).
144. Feldman, supra note 133, at 2080.
145. Kaplow, supra note 137, at 517-18. Many proponents of this perspective were
students of Aaron Director at the University of Chicago. Id. at 518 n.12.
146. Posner, supra note 135, at 932 (considering himself a member of the Chicago
School).
147. Kaplow, supra note 137, at 518 (citing POSNER, supra note 74, at 173).
148. Feldman, supra note 133, at 2080.
149. Id.
150. See Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1,
36 n.151 (1994) (highlighting the leading post-Chicago scholarship); Lombardo, supra note
44, at 389 n.10 (including Louis Kaplow, Janusz Ordover, Stephen Salop, Daniel
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able to152 gain
school of thought believes that a monopolist may be
•
In
additional profits through leveraging in certain circumstances.
addition, the argument has been made that presuming that a firm always
acts to increase profits may be incorrect.'53 It has been suggested that the
motivation behind monopoly leveraging activities may be a reduction in
competition over time, rather than immediate profits.'-" This newly
developed line of thought considers that many large firms are more
intent on maximizing their total output, sales, or growth rates rather than
their profits. 55 This theory is in direct opposition to that of Chicago
School economists, who conclude that firms will not choose to pursue
predatory practices when the losses outweigh potential gains.'56
However, courts have been hesitant to adopt post-Chicago theories due
to the detailed, fact-intensive analysis that they require."'
III. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE LEVERAGING THEORY IN
ANTITRUST LAW

The two primary issues relating to the monopolistic leveraging
doctrine today are whether leveraging to gain a competitive advantage
violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act and whether the leveraging theory
can be appropriately applied in industries with significant network
externalities.'58 The first issue is a much easier one to resolve; it is clear
that an independent claim of leveraging cannot be justified under Section
Scheffmen, and Oliver Williamson in a list of post-Chicago economists); Peritz, supra note
134, at 917-19 (discussing the new post-Chicago economics).
151. Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 881 (asserting that "an evaluation of the
anticompetitive effects of leveraging behavior will be fact-dependent").
152. See Kaplow, supra note 137, at 520; Feldman, supranote 133, at 2086.
153. Kaplow, supra at note 137, at 555 (recognizing the possibility that management
might be motivated by goals other than profit maximization).
154. Id. at 524. For a full discussion of Chicago and Post-Chicago theory on
monopolistic leveraging, see Lombardo, supra note 44, at 417-39.
155. See Lombardo, supra note 44, at 422-25.; see also Harlan M. Blake & William K.
Jones, Towards a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422, 460-61
(1965). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS 613 (1974) (noting that the best way to increase a firm's size is not to
enhance output but to maximize profits).
156. See BORK, supra note 39, at 151-52.
157. Feldman, supranote 133, at 2080 n.4; see Posner, supra note 135, at 937-39 (noting
that judicial antitrust doctrine more or less follows changes in economic theory, but with a
lag). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of
IndustrialOrganization,68 TEx. L. REv. 105 (1989).
15& See, e.g., Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 272
(2d Cir. 2001); David A. Balto, Standard Setting in a Network Economy, Remarks at the
Cutting Edge Antitrust Law Seminars International,2000 WL 641600 (F.T.C.).
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As for the second issue, the applicability of leveraging theory to
dynamic industries, a considerable amount of debate among both courts
and commentators remains."O

2.159

A. Resolution of the Debate Over an Independent Leveraging Claim
Leveraging monopoly power to impact a second market can have anticompetitive effects. 6' When those effects are combined with the intent
to monopolize, the activity becomes a violation of Section 2, either
because the firm is successful in achieving monopolization or because
there is a dangerous probability of achieving monopolization.' 6' Therein
lies the appropriate role of the leveraging theory in antitrust law, as a
way by which a firm commits a traditional violation of Section 2. To find
that leveraging monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage without more - violates Section 2 would be wholly counter to the Act's
purpose and to efficient and appropriate business strategies.
The Supreme Court asserted that the purpose of the Sherman Act
could not be the protection of competitors against aggressive competition
because competition is exactly what the Act seeks to foster. 63 While

courts have clearly moved beyond the days in which they asserted that all
monopolies are at least highly suspect, the circuit courts seem reluctant
to eliminate the monopolistic leveraging claim, which is clearly based on
159. See Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 372-74 (arguing that "monopoly leveraging
is, from an economic perspective, theoretically bankrupt"); Kattan, supra note 129, at 41
(suggesting that "the doctrine's days are numbered").
160. See generally Balto, supra note 158; Piraino, supra note 90, at 1; Feldman, supra
note 133, at 2079; Posner, supra note 135, at 925.
161. See Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 373-76 (arguing that monopoly leveraging
causes welfare losses); Lombardo, supra note 44, at 430 (stating that "strategic behavior...
can be used by a firm with monopoly power in one market to place its rivals in a second
market at a competitive disadvantage" and further that "this type of unilateral
anticompetitive behavior stems from the abuse of the monopolist's power to control price
in the first market"); see also Feldman, supra note 133, at 2106 (claiming that monopoly
leveraging can damage competition because a monopolist may leverage "to prevent
erosion of its primary monopoly").
162- See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
163. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). The Court
interpreted the purpose of the Sherman Act as being the protection of consumers from
"the failure of the market," not the protection of businesses from a successful market. Id.
The Court further stated that the Act does not seek to punish competitive behavior, or
even behavior that is "severely" competitive, but rather it focuses on conduct that tends to
eliminate competition itself. Id. The Court also noted an effort to avoid constructing
Section 2 in a way that "might chill competition, rather than foster it." Id. See also
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993)
("Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without
more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.").
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that proposition. 65 The Act is concerned with monopoly power and
seeks to prohibit firms from achieving that power through predatory
means or from using it to eliminate competitors or harm consumers.16'
But to say that the Sherman Act seeks to prohibit firms, which have
monopoly power, from obtaining a competitive advantage would mean
that such firms could not operate at their highest level of efficiency for
fear that doing so would result in a violation.
While it may be possible for a firm to profit or otherwise gain from
leveraging monopoly power, the efficiencies created may also benefit
consumers.'6 This is one of the primary responses to the government's
accusations that Microsoft leveraged its operating system monopoly
power to both maintain that monopoly and attempt to gain a monopoly
in the browser market in violation of the Sherman Act. 67 It is argued
that Microsoft's practices, such as integrating the two products, were

164. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979)
(quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass.
1953), affd per curiam,247 U.S. 521 (1954)); Puhala, supranote 26, at 124.
165. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir. 1991)
(stating that the traditional interpretation of the Sherman Act suggests that it punishes the
use of predatory behavior to attain or maintain a monopoly and that the "ultimate victim"
of such activity is the consumer); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 602, 610-11 (1985); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,427 (2d Cir. 1945).
166. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548-49 (9th Cir.
1991) (noting that leveraging is a cost incurred because our antitrust laws permit efficient
monopolies and that leveraging may actually undermine monopoly power and have procompetitive effects); Kattan, supra note 129, at 41 (recognizing that monopoly leveraging
may produce benefits from economic integration); Piraino, supra note 90, at 62 (noting
that network monopolies can benefit consumers).
167. David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Economics of the Microsoft Antitrust
Case: An Updated Post-Trial Primer (2000) at http://www.neramicrosoft.comlevell/
nera au.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (suggesting that Microsoft's activities "helped
consumers by lowering prices, increasing quality and expanding output of Internet
browsing software").
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done to provide customers with a higher quality 69product.'6
The
defendants in Berkey Photo made the same argument.
The Supreme Court should address this issue to remove the ambiguity
faced by antitrust lawyers as they counsel their clients. The trend clearly
implies that the leveraging doctrine as a distinct claim under Section 2
has met its demise. 7 Antitrust laws are concerned with protecting
competition, not competitors. 7' As one antitrust practitioner put it, "[i]n
an era in which competitiveness in global markets is a key to national
economic performance, a doctrine that quite consciously seeks to curb
the competitive advantages of large companies seems out of sync with
the times.' ' 172 Although it may be clear that the popularity of the
monopolistic leveraging doctrine is declining, at least in terms of a
separate, less stringent Section 2 violation,'73 the fact that the circuit split
remains is detrimental and contrary to an important tenet of our legal
system - certainty. From the earliest days of our government, the idea
that individuals should be aware of the law and its consequences has
been fundamental. 74 To continue with the law in its current state would
mean that a monopolist would not know whether it is violating antitrust
75
law when it spends money to compete or when it improves its product.

16& See id. Evans and Schmalensee point out that the court seemingly acknowledged
this point in its finding of facts:
The debut of Internet Explorer and its rapid improvement gave Netscape an
incentive to improve Navigator's quality at a competitive rate. The inclusion of
Internet Explorer with Windows at no separate charge increased general
familiarity with the Internet and reduced the cost to the public of gaining access
to it, at least in part because it compelled Netscape to stop charging for
Navigator. These actions thus contributed to improving the quality of Web
browsing, lowering its cost, and increasing its availability, thereby benefiting
consumers.
Id. (citing Court's Findings of Fact, T 408).
169. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); see
Puhala, supra note 26, at 123-24.
170. Kattan, supra note 129, at 41.
171. Id. at 42.
172 Id.
173. Blair & Esquibel, supra note 3, at 387.
174. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (discussing the policy of stare
decisis and the need for the law to be settled and predictable).
175. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 167, at 8-9 (suggesting that the government's
test for whether an activity is predatory would prohibit successful companies from trying
to remain successful).
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B. Monopoly Leveraging in Dynamic or Network Industries
The real challenge with regard to the leveraging theory is its
application to markets with network externalities.17 6 Some argue that
leveraging poses an even greater threat in such markets.' 7 Network
externalities refer to the economies of scale in consumption - "the
situation in which the larger the firm's output is ... the more valuable
that output is to its consumers." 7 ' When a network monopolizes a
particular market, potential competitors "often cannot compete in a
related market without access to the network. 1 79 In the case of
Microsoft, potential competitor application programs cannot operate
without access to the Windows operating system. Therefore, Microsoft
can leverage its power by simply refusing to give competitors access to
Windows and thereby gaining a significant advantage in the applications
market.' When monopoly power is leveraged in this way, a secondary
impact is an increase in entry barriers in the monopolized market
because the switching costs are high. 8' The Microsoft court avoided using
the language of "monopoly leveraging," but the theory on which its
decision was based is essentially that. Given the dispute over the
legitimacy of the leveraging theory, the court's avoidance of the term is
Commentators have also acknowledged the
certainly understandable.
unique concerns that arise when leveraging occurs in dynamic network
markets, suggesting that innovation incentives of competitors will be
blunted83 if leveraging is practiced to decrease the likelihood of competitor
entry.
176. See Piraino, supra note 136, at 824.
177. Id.
178. Posner, supra note 135, at 928. Posner provided the example of the telephone,
explaining that a telephone is worthless unless there is more than one subscriber. The
more subscribers, the more valuable the service is to each person. Id. Posner also noted
that the value is not in the networks themselves; rather, the network is the "conduit" for
valued services. Id. See also Muris, supra note 21, at 718.
179. Piraino, supra note 136, at 824.
180. Id.
181. Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 877-78 (suggesting that the blunting of innovation
incentives is particularly troubling).
182. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (2000). The Microsoft court
acknowledged that there is considerable debate as to whether "(old economy) § 2
monopolization doctrines should apply to firms competing in dynamic technological
markets characterized by network effects." Id. The court further noted that there is a lack
of consensus as to whether, and to what extent, current antitrust law should be amended
to recognize the nature of such markets. Id.
183. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust Enforcement in
Dynamic Network Industries, Address Before the Software Publishers' Association (Mar.
24, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1611.htm; cf. Lawrence A.
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The counter-argument to the proposition that monopoly leveraging
poses a greater danger in network markets is as follows: because there is
an extraordinary amount of capital available for investment in
technology and because new networks can be created quickly, network
monopoly power is still vulnerable to competition.'A However, even if a
firm with network monopoly power loses its position to a new entrant,
the firm had an opportunity to leverage its position prior to its demise,
and it could do so more easily because of the network externalities.'
Moreover, while the firm may lose its monopoly power in the network
market, it may retain the competitive advantage gained in the secondary
market.
A second counter-argument is that leveraging is more typically used in
innovation industries as a defensive, rather than as an offensive, tool.
Commentators have argued that a firm uses monopoly leveraging to
maintain strength in its current market, to integrate products to produce
demand in the primary market, and to compete vigorously in a related
market and thereby decrease competition in the primary market because
competitors must shift resources to the related market.1" Microsoft is an
example of a firm that has used leveraging as a defensive, rather than
predatory, mechanism."
IV. CONCLUSION

The use of monopoly power to affect a second market can have anticompetitive effects. However, these effects result in liability under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act only when they rise to the level of
monopolization or attempted monopolization. The Supreme Court must
step in, however, and prevent plaintiffs from continuing to assert Section
2 violations based on monopolistic leveraging. Acquiring a competitive
advantage through the use of monopoly power is not the aim of Section 2
of the Sherman Act. The majority of the circuits addressing this issue
Sullivan & Ann I. Jones, Monopoly Conduct, Especially Leveraging Power from One
Productor Market to Another, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 165,
175 (1992) (discussing the way in which prohibiting leveraging will protect innovation).
184. Posner, supra note 135, at 930 (noting that Schumpeter's theory that temporary
monopolies operate to maximize innovation that provides substantially more social
benefits than the social costs of the resulting short-lived monopoly prices may be the
reality of the new economy).
185. Lombardo, supra note 44, 421 (arguing that even if a monopolist could not
indefinitely prevent new entrants into the market, it could delay such entry and thereby
extend the time during which it could reap profits).
186. Feldman, supranote 133, at 2098.
187. Id.
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have made similar findings; all that remains now is for the Supreme
Court to make this same distinction and finally settle this area of law.
At the same time, the use of the leveraging theory to describe the way
in which a firm might commit a traditional Section 2 violation is
increasingly controversial in today's economy. While firms can and
should seek the benefits of economic integration, those benefits cannot
cross the line into harm for competition. In industries where separate
products are closely related, the line between harmful and beneficial
leveraging can be difficult to draw. Microsoft is a clear example of the
problems that arise when the monopoly leveraging theory is applied to
innovation or network industries. Although the court went to great
lengths to justify the applicability of traditional antitrust doctrine to
dynamic markets, it is clear that significant uncertainty remains in the
minds of many economists and business leaders.
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